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Abstract
This paper investigates the in°ation rate that should be set as the target for the
central bank. To this end, we develop a two-sector economy model in the existence
of long-lived durables. In contrast to recent studies that have been conducted on
how monetary policy can a®ect the role of durable goods, which examine only the
production sector, we introduce a service market. Accordingly, we can endogenously
derive the traditional user cost equation and the price-rent ratio. Our main ¯ndings
are as follows: First, even in cases where both service and production sectors are
equally sticky, the user cost is more important than the purchase price, from the
perspective of welfare loss. Second, in contrast to the situation in the economy
that includes only nondurables, a temporary shock persistently in°uences output
°uctuations. However, this does not mean that welfare loss increases as the degree
of durability increases. Third, welfare is found to be a strictly increasing function
of durability.
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1 Introduction
What is the role of the central bank? New Keynesian literature focuses on characteriz-
ing the optimal monetary policy in environments where there are nominal rigidities and
imperfect competition. A key ¯nding of these studies is that a zero in°ation rate in
all periods should be a characteristic of any optimal monetary policy. The reason price
stability has been identi¯ed as a key component of optimal monetary policy is straight-
forward: by the central bank keeping the price level constant, in°ation costs are kept to
a minimum under nominal rigidities.
However, in reality, there are numerous prices and in°ations; hence, the central bank
should carefully choose what in°ation to target. Accordingly, this issue has been examined
by many researchers. For example, Aoki (2001) considers a situation where there are
di®erent rigidities among sectors. He constructs a two-sector model in which prices are
°exible in one sector and sticky in the other, and concludes that stabilizing sticky-price
in°ation is su±cient for ensuring optimum monetary policy. Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
(2000) introduce distortions in the labor market as well as in the goods market. They
state that wage in°ation is a very important target of the central bank. Huang and
Liu (2006) investigate the case where both CPI and PPI goods sectors are sticky. They
¯nd that to decide on an optimal in°ation rate, the central bank should put weight on
both CPI and PPI sectors. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Ghironi (2006) ¯nd that the Taylor
principle, when applied at the sectoral level, is not needed at the aggregate level. Some
studies have examined the role of monetary policy in the existence of durable goods.
For instance, Erceg and Levin (2006) introduce durable goods into the model of Erceg,
Henderson, and Levin (2000) and obtain a similar result. Monacelli (2007, 2009) insists
that durable goods act as collateral when there are heterogeneous households. However,
these previous studies do not explicitly introduce the service market into their models.
Accordingly, we infer that in the previous literature, the service market is implicitly
assumed to be a frictionless shadow market.
In this paper, we build a general equilibrium model that has two di®erent elements.
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First, we explicitly introduce a service market so that we can di®erentiate the price of
goods in the production sector and the rental price for the service °ow in the service
sector that the household actually consumes.12 From this, we can derive a traditional
user cost equation that determines the purchase of additional durable goods and the rent
for the corresponding services. One of our goals is to verify the relationship between
the rental price and the purchase price in this situation. In contrast to previous studies,
which develop one type of pricing relationship between a representative household and
production ¯rms, our model features service ¯rms, referred to as investors, who manage
the durable stocks. At the beginning of each period, the investors purchase new output
from the production sector, transform this output °ow with the existing stocks into
durable service °ows, and rent them to the household. At the end of each period, the
used durables are returned to the investors and become the initial stocks for the beginning
of the next period.
Furthermore, we can derive a price-rent ratio by introducing a service market. The
price-rent ratio of highly durable goods can o®er another explanation of why durable
goods generate larger responses to exogenous shocks. Most previous studies, such as
Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007), have stressed that the decision to purchase durable
goods depends on the household's perception of the relationship between the marginal
utility of the good's nondurable consumption and the marginal gains that are derived
from the durable services it o®ers. The high elasticity of substitution for the purchase
of durable goods based on this relationship is a key mechanism that can explain why
the response of durable goods to the macro shocks of the market is large. In our model,
the investor in the service sector manages the total durable stocks and functions as the
decision maker in terms of durable purchases. High durability implies that revenues from
1With a slight abuse of notation, I interchangeably use the terms \rental price," \service price," and
\user cost" in the paper.
2Our endogenously derived user cost equation separates prices into user cost and purchase price.
Previous studies do not include the service market, in their models, which means that the prices of
durable goods and the corresponding service tend to be used in a confusing way. The purchase price is
the price of the physical good itself while the rental price is the actual price of the corresponding service
that follows consumption. In our model, which includes the service market, the price index in the goods
market and utility-based price index are considered separately.
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the ownership of durable goods are consistently obtained. This is because future demand
for the services by households is related to the current purchase of durable goods by
investors. Therefore, the investors' demand for durable goods is generally an increasing
function of durability. Thus, the investor's decision can account for the larger response
of durable goods to exogenous shocks, in comparison to nondurable goods.
The second way in which our approach departs from that adopted by previous stud-
ies on this topic is that, rather than basing our model on a standard complete-market
framework with °exible prices, we introduce nominal rigidity in each sector and assess
the extent to which the service market in°uence household welfare. We can consider two
nominal rigidities because we have two durable prices. In particular, the nominal rigidity
in the service sector restricts the e±cient relationship between two prices, and hence, the
user cost equation and the price-rent ratio are distorted.
The main ¯ndings of this paper are as follows: First, in the economy with long-lived
durables, where nominal rigidity exists in both service and good markets, the movements
of user cost in°ation and service °ows are more important than the movements of purchase
price in°ation and output °ows, from the perspective of social welfare. We also ¯nd that
the utility-based social loss function implies that service-in°ation variability and the
°uctuation of the service °ows should be given more weight. Second, we ¯nd that welfare
loss is not an increasing function of durability. In the economy with nondurables, a
temporary shock in°uences only the current output. However, in the economy with long-
lived durables, even a temporary shock persistently a®ects the sequence of output until
the currently a®ected output depreciates entirely. However, our endogenously derived
loss function with only output gaps reveals that welfare loss does not necessarily increase
as durability increases. Third, household welfare is found to be an increasing function of
durability. The ¯rst-ordered terms of the derived lifetime welfare are strictly increasing
functions of durability. In a highly durable economy, the loss from the volatilities of
macro variables may increase, but services to be consumed are abundant in comparison
to the nondurable economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
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model. Section 3 de¯nes the equilibrium. Section 4 presents a descriptive analysis of
the °exible case. Section 5 discusses the distortion economy. Sections 6 and 7 present
the optimal monetary policy and the optimal simple rules. Sections 8 and 9 compare
the highly durable economy with the nondurable economy and analyze the relationship
between durability and welfare. Section 10 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we develop a model for an in¯nite-horizon economy with durable goods
and services. The key feature of our model is that durable goods can be traded in two
ways{as an ownership of a good or as a lease contract of the corresponding service °ow
in each period. To investigate the role of durable services and prices, we segment the
durable market into product and service markets.
In the service sector, there are ¯nal and intermediate service ¯rms called investors.
The ¯nal investors are competitive and produce a single homogenous good by using a
CES technology to combine the di®erentiated intermediate goods. The investors o®er
this durable service to the household. The intermediate investors are monopolistically
competitive suppliers in the service market and price-takers in the input market. They
purchase output °ows from the production sector and lease services from their durable
stock. The returned durable stocks then become their wealth. Furthermore, we as-
sume that the intermediate-good ¯rms set their prices on a staggered basis because price
changes incur adjustment costs.
The other assumptions are standard as in the New Keynesian literature. Within any
production sector, there are both ¯nal and intermediate-good ¯rms. The ¯nal-good ¯rms
share the same features as the ¯nal investors in the service sector. The intermediate ¯rms
are monopolistically competitive producers who demand labor from the households. For
simplicity, we assume linear technology in labor input. The other features of the model
are the same as those in the service sector.
The economy is composed of a continuum of homogeneous households in the interval
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(0; 1) who supply labor to the intermediate-good ¯rms in the production sector. The
households purchase durable services from the ¯nal investor by using their income and
debts.
2.1 Service sector
In the service market, a perfectly competitive ¯nal investor purchases Dt(i) units from
the intermediate investor i. The ¯nal investor operates the production function
Dt ´
µZ 1
0
Dt(i)
"rD
¡1
"rD di
¶ "rD
"rD
¡1
; (1)
where Dt(i) is the quantity of the intermediate service i demanded by the ¯nal investor,
and "rD is the elasticity of substitution among the di®erentiated varieties. The maxi-
mization of pro¯ts yields the demand function for the intermediate service i for all t ¸ 0:
Dt(i) =
µ
rD;t(i)
rD;t
¶¡"rD
Dt; (2)
where rD;t ´
µR 1
0
rD;t(i)
1¡"rDdi
¶ 1
1¡"rD
is the service price index.
There is a continuum of ¯rms producing di®erentiated services indexed in the inter-
val [0; 1]. Each ¯rm i is a monopolistic competitor in the service market and a price-
taker in the input market. Following Rotemberg (1982), the ¯rm is assumed to face a
quadratic cost proportional to the total durable services in changing its price equal to
µrD
2
(
rD;t(i)
rD;t¡1(i)
¡ 1)2Dt, measured by the ¯nished service. µrD governs the magnitude of the
price adjustment cost, measuring the degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity.
Given the initial value, D¡1(i), the intermediate service ¯rm i 2 [0; 1] chooses the
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sequence frD;t(i); ID;t(i)g1t=0 to maximize
E0
1X
t=0
¤t
·
rD;t(i)Dt(i)¡ PD;t(i)ID;t(i)¡ µrD
2
µ
rD;t(i)
rD;t¡1(i)
¡ 1
¶2
rD;tDt
¸
(3)
s.t. (2) and
Dt(i) = (1¡ ±)Dt¡1(i) + ID;t(i); (4)
where E is an expectation operator, and ¤t;t+k ´ ¤t+k¤t = ¯k
USD;t+k
USD;t
rD;t
rD;t+k
is a stochastic
discount factor, where USD;t measures the marginal utility value to the household of an
additional unit of real pro¯ts during period t. ± is the depreciation rate of durable goods,
and ID;t(i) is the newly purchased output °ows from the production sector in period t.
The \used" or second-hand (1 ¡ ±)Dt¡1(i) stocks that are returned to the intermediate
investor at the end of the previous period can be sold at PD;t(i) in the current period.
Thus, intermediate investors make new demands for as much as Dt(i) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Dt¡1(i)
durable goods from the ¯nal-good ¯rm in the production sector.
In the symmetric equilibrium, where rD;t(i) = rD;t for all i, the ¯rst order condition
is
(¼rD;t ¡ 1)¼rD;t =Et
·
¤t;t+1
rD;t+1
rD;t
Dt+1
Dt
(¼rD;t+1 ¡ 1)¼rD;t+1
¸
+
"rD
µrD
½
¥rD;t ¡
"rD ¡ 1
"rD
¡ (1¡ ±)Et
·
¤t;t+1
rD;t+1
rD;t
¥rD;t+1
¸¾
; (5)
where ¼rD;t ´ rD;trD;t¡1 is the gross service in°ation rate, and ¥rD;t is the real marginal cost
in period t in the service sector. One distinctive feature of this sector is that the current
in°ation is a function of the expectation of the real marginal cost in the next period as
well as the in°ation in the next period and the current real marginal cost. This feature
insulates the most important mechanism in our model.
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2.2 Production sector
In the production sector, a perfectly competitive ¯nal-good producer purchases Yt(i) units
of intermediate good j. The ¯nal-good producer operates the production function
Yt ´
µZ 1
0
Yt(j)
"PD
¡1
"PD di
¶ "PD
"PD
¡1
; (6)
where Yt(j) is the quantity of the intermediate good j that is demanded by the ¯nal-good
producer, and "PD is the elasticity of substitution among the di®erentiated varieties. The
maximization of pro¯ts yields the demand function for the intermediate good j for all t:
Yt(j) =
µ
PD;t(j)
PD;t
¶¡"PD
Yt; (7)
where the price index is PD;t ´
µR 1
0
PD;t(j)
1¡"PDdj
¶ 1
1¡"PD
.
A continuum of ¯rms produces di®erentiated products indexed in the interval [0; 1].
A typical ¯rm j hires Nt(j) units of labor from the households in order to produce Yt(j)
units of intermediate good j, using a linear production technology:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j); j 2 [0; 1]; (8)
where At is a productivity shock. at, which is a logarithm of the t-period productivity
shock in the production sector, follows
at+1 = ½aat + u
a
t+1; ½a 2 [0; 1); (9)
where Etu
a
t+1 = 0 and Etu
a
tu
a0
t = ¾
a2.
Each ¯rm j is a monopolistic competitor in the product markets. Following Rotemberg
(1982), we assume that the ¯rm faces a quadratic cost proportional to output in changing
its price equal to
µPD
2
(
PD;t(j)
PD;t¡1(j)
¡ 1)2Yt, measured by the ¯nished good. µPD governs the
magnitude of the price adjustment cost, measuring the degree of sectoral nominal price
8
rigidity.
Subject to (7) and (8), the intermediate ¯rm j 2 [0; 1] in the good sector solves
max
PD;t(j);Nt(j)
Ek
1X
t=k
¤t;k
·
PD;t(j)Yt(j)¡WtNt(j)¡ µPD
2
µ
PD;t(j)
PD;t¡1(j)
¡ 1
¶2
PD;tYt
¸
; (10)
where Wt denotes a nominal wage rate.
In the symmetric equilibrium where PD;t(j) = PD;t for all j, the ¯rst order condition
becomes
(¼PD;t ¡ 1)¼PD;t =Et
·
¤t;t+1
PD;t+1
PD;t
Yt+1
Yt
(¼PD;t+1 ¡ 1)¼PD;t+1
¸
+
"PD
µPD
·
¥PD;t ¡
"PD ¡ 1
"PD
¸
; (11)
where ¼PD;t ´ PD;tPD;t¡1 is the gross producer in°ation rate, and ¥PD;t is the real marginal
cost in the production sector.
2.3 Household
The utility function of the representative household is given by
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
·
U(SD;t)¡ V (Nt)
¸
; (12)
where ¯ 2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount factor. SD;t denotes the total durable service °ows
to be consumed in period t, andNt denotes the amount of labor supplied in the production
sector. The period utility is assumed to be continuous and twice di®erentiable, with
USD;t ´ @U(SD;t)@SD;t > 0, USDSD;t ´
@2U(SD;t)
@S2D;t
· 0, VN;t ´ @V (Nt)@Nt · 0, and VNN;t ´
@2V (Nt)
@N2t
· 0.
The purchase of a durable service is ¯nanced by the labor income, the ownership of
the intermediate ¯rms in the service and production sectors, government transfers, and
assets. The nominal budget constraint for all t is given by
rD;tSD;t +Rt¡1Bt¡1 = Bt +WtNt + ¡t + Tt; (13)
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where rD;t is a service price, Bt denotes a nominal bond, Rt denotes a nominal return of
the nominal bond, ¡t denotes dividends from the ownership of ¯rms in all sectors, and
Tt denotes the lump-sum transfer from the government.
Dividing this by the service price, rD;t, we obtain the real budget constraint:
SD;t +Rt¡1
bt¡1
¼rD;t
= bt +
Wt
rD;t
Nt +
¡t + Tt
rD;t
: (14)
We also assume that no Ponzi scheme holds:
lim
T!1
EtBT · 0 (15)
for all t.
2.3.1 Optimal allocation and implication
Given the initial value, b¡1, the household chooses the labor, consumption, and asset
pro¯le fNt; SD;t; bt; g1t=0 to maximize (12) subject to (14). The ¯rst-order-necessary con-
ditions thus become
¡ VN;t
USD;t
=
Wt
rD;t
; (16)
1 = ¯Et
·
USD;t+1
USD;t
Rt
¼rD;t+1
¸
: (17)
Equation (16) is the intra-temporal decision condition between the labor supply and
the consumption of durable service °ows in period t. Equation (17) is a standard Euler
condition with respect to the inter-temporal consumption decision of durable service °ows
for all t.
2.4 Transmission mechanism of the monetary policy
In this economy, the stance of the monetary authority has two direct e®ects. The ¯rst is
a traditional e®ect exerted on the inter-temporal decision by the household. As the Euler
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equation indicates, a high interest rate encourages households to save their wealth and
postpone consumption. The new second channel is the service market. Iacoviello and
Neri (2011) state that the nominal rigidity of wage is very important because housing
investment becomes very sensitive with the introduction of wage rigidity. In our economy,
the nominal rigidity of service price plays a similar role.
Rearranging the ¯rst order condition of the investors, we get the following no arbitrage
condition between purchases of bonds and durable goods:
Rt = Et(Zt): (18)
The right-hand side is a one-period holding return, Zt ´ (1¡±)PD;t+1PD;t¡ª¡1rD;trD;t¡¶t , which results
from buying the durable goods in period t and selling them in period t + 1. The term
in the numerator is the capital gain. To obtain a rate of return, we divide capital gain
by the net purchase price in the denominator. ¶t is a risk-premium purchasing durable
good. Therefore, the households are indi®erent between purchasing riskless bonds and
investing in durable goods.3 From this channel, the increase in the interest rate induces
the investors to purchase more durable goods from the production sector. When dura-
bility is low, this channel e®ect is trivial. However, as durability increases, this channel
exerts a bigger e®ect than the IS channel does.
2.5 Monetary policy
We assume that the monetary authority obeys the Taylor-type rule. We consider the
following instrument:
Rt
R
=
µ
¼rD;t
¼rD
¶½¼rDµ¼PD;t
¼PD
¶½¼PD
; (19)
where the variables with no subscript denote the steady state levels of corresponding
variables.
3Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2007) analyze the di®erence between °exible and ¯xed rates in the
housing market. However, we do not analyze these e®ects in this paper.
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Sectoral in°ation targeting occurs when the central bank targets only one of the
Taylor rules. When ½¼rD > 1 and the other coe±cients are zero, the target becomes the
aggregate service in°ation targeting. When ½¼PD > 1 and the other coe±cients are zero,
the target becomes the aggregate good in°ation targeting.
2.6 Market clearing condition
The market clearing conditions in the service and good markets are
Dt = SD;t +
µrD
2
(¼rD;t ¡ 1)2Dt (20)
Yt = ID;t +
µPD
2
(¼D;t ¡ 1)2Yt; (21)
where some proportions of the ¯nal service and good are allocated to the resource costs
that originate from the price adjustment. Labor and bond markets also clear in the
equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the allocation SD;t, bt, Nt for the households; the allocations
Dt(i) and ID;t(i) and price rD;t(i) for the durable investor i 2 [0; 1]; and the allocations
Yt(i) and Nt(i) and price PD;t(i) for the durable-goods producer i 2 [0; 1]. Together with
wagesWt, these satisfy the following: Taking prices and the wage as given, the household's
allocations solve its utility maximizing problem; taking the wage and all prices but its
own as given, the allocations and the price of each durable service investor solve its pro¯t
maximizing problem; taking all prices but its own as given, the allocations and the price
of each durable-good producer solve its pro¯t maximizing problem; taking the wage and
all prices but its own as given, the market for bonds and labor clears.
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4 E±cient allocation
In this section and the subsequent ones, we investigate the di®erence between the allo-
cations of an e±cient economy and those for one that is distorted. From the household
perspective, the sequence of durable service °ows and leisure is the most important fac-
tor. However, there exist two kinds of distortions¡of price and mark-up¡in this economy.
In the economy with price stickiness, a good monetary policy is to minimize distortions
because doing so indirectly supports the optimal path of durable service and leisure.
As a ¯rst step, we focus on household preferences, the technology for producing new
durable output °ows, and the price-rent ratio for managing durable stocks, to investigate
the optimal allocation. The intra-temporal condition of the household can be written as
¡ VN;t
USD;t
=
Wt
PD;t
PD;t
rD;t
; (22)
where the left-hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and
durable consumption in period t and the right-hand side is composed of the multiplied
sum of the labor income and the price-rent ratio, where the second term represents an
asset e®ect managing durable stocks. If the household marginally increases the quantity
of labor supply, the additional e®ect of these two factors would be exactly o®set by the
utility loss associated with the decrease in leisure time.
In a frictionless economy, the ¯rst term on the right-hand side equals the marginal
product of labor in the production sector. The second term is the price-rent ratio that
explains the relationship between the purchase price of durable goods and the rental
price of the durable service °ow. The e±cient price allocation in the service market is
directly related to the e±cient allocation of the durable stocks. For the same disutility
of labor supply, the marginal utility of durable consumption in period t decreases as
durability increases. This is simply because the service °ow to be consumed becomes
abundant in each period. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution on the left-hand
side increases. This e®ect is absorbed into the price-rent ratio term on the right-hand
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side. When durability is high, the price-rent ratio increases because this allows persistent
enjoyment the marginal gains that result from possessing the good.
4.1 Frictionless price-rent ratio
To investigate the dynamics of the price-rent ratio in a frictionless economy, we derive
this ratio by solving the investor's maximization problem. The real marginal cost of pur-
chasing a new durable good should be equated to the total marginal gains from managing
durable services until the newly purchased good depreciates entirely:
¥rD;t = Et
· 1X
k=t
(1¡ ±)(k¡t)¤t;k rD;k
rD;t
¸
; (23)
where the price-rent ratio is a function of a rational forecast of the stochastic future
discount rates and the expected growth rate of rental costs. Furthermore, the price-
rent ratio is an increasing function of durability, (1¡ ±). High durability implies that the
purchased good survives for a long period, and hence, the value of the good also increases.
Note that when ± = 1, the price-rent ratio equals one, which means that the good price
and the service price are the same.
4.2 Labor supply and the demand for services
Plugging the frictionless price-rent ratio and marginal product of labor into the intra-
temporal condition, we get
¡VN;t = AtEt
½ 1X
k=t
[(1¡ ±)¯](k¡t)USD;k
¾
: (24)
The marginal disutility of labor on the left-hand side can be understood as the shadow
value of current production, while the right-hand side shows the marginal gains that
result from the consumption of services from period t onwards. As discussed by Barsky,
House, and Kimball (2007), the steady state stock-°ow ratio is 1
±
. For a highly durable
good, this ratio is high. If ¯ is high and ± is low, the shadow value of current production
14
is dominated by future terms.
5 Distortions
Previous New Keynesian studies focus on the distortion in only the production sector.
However, the distortion in the service sector is also an important aspect of the real
economy. The housing market is a very good example of a market where the rental price
is rigid while the goods price is °exible and volatile. Therefore, in this section, we analyze
how in each sector, these distortions di®er.
5.1 Sticky purchase price
To investigate the transmission mechanism of distortions in each sector, we present the
price equation in terms of distortions. When the purchase price is sticky, the relationship
of the nominal wage rate with the purchase price becomes
¥PD;t = ªPD;t; (25)
where ªPD;t ´ 1¹PD +ÃPD;t.
4 ªPD;t is an e±ciency parameter that consolidates all frictions
in the production sector. The ¯rst term on the right-hand side represents the mark-up
friction, and the second term, ÃPD;t, is a distortion that originates from the price stickiness
in the goods sector. Note that when the production sector is perfectly competitive (¹PD =
1) and the purchase price is °exible (µPD = 0 and ÃPD;t = 1), all distortions disappear
(ªPD;t = 1). However, ªPD;t deviates from its e±cient level when the purchase price is
sticky. For example, when the ¯rms attempt to increase their current prices, a positive
gap may occur between current in°ation and the expected rate of future in°ation in the
production sector. In this case, the price adjustment cost depresses the ¯rms' decision.
Thus, they set the current purchase cost ine±ciently at a lower level than the °exible
case, and vice versa.
4ÃPD;t ´ µPD"PD
½
(¼D;t ¡ 1)¼D;t ¡ ¯Et
·
USD;t+1
USD;t
¥rD;t+1
¥rD;t
Yt+1
Yt
(¼D;t+1 ¡ 1)¼D;t+1
¸¾
.
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5.2 Distorted price-rent ratio
When the user cost is °exible, the price-rent ratio is a function of the marginal utility
gaps. However, when the user cost is sticky, the price-rent ratio is distorted as follows:
¥rD;t = Et
· 1X
k=t
(1¡ ±)(k¡t)¤t;k rD;k
rD;t
ªrD;k
¸
; (26)
where ªrD;t ´ 1¹rD + ÃrD;t.
5 ªrD;t is an e±ciency parameter in the service sector. ÃrD;t
represents the distortion from the price stickiness.
When the user cost is sticky, the current level of the price-rent ratio is attributed to
three factors: (a) the entire paths of future discount rates, (b) dividend growth rates, and
(c) the entire sequence of fªrD;kg1k=t. In the asset price literature, the paths of future
discount rates and dividends are key factors in explaining the price-rent ratio.6 However,
in this economy, another factor, price distortion, severely distorts the price-rent ratio.
The current price-rent ratio is in°uenced by future distortions when the service market
is distorted. When nominal rigidity exists in the service sector, the current in°ation of
the user cost is distorted. Furthermore, the current purchase price is a function of the
present value of the future user cost. Therefore, the price-rent ratio and the purchase
price are heavily distorted when the rental market is sticky.
5.3 Descriptive explanation of welfare loss
Combining equations (25) and (26), the marginal rate of substitution between service
°ows and labor in period t can be written as a function of the total distortions in this
economy:
¡ UN;t
USD;t
= AtªPD;tEt
· 1X
k=t
(1¡ ±)(k¡t)¤t;k rD;k
rD;t
ªrD;k
¸
: (27)
5ÃrD;t ´ µrD"rD
½
(¼rD;t ¡ 1)¼rD;t ¡ ¯Et
·
USD;t+1
USD;t
Dt+1
Dt
(¼rD;t+1 ¡ 1)¼rD;t+1
¸¾
.
6For example, Cochrane (1992).
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Note that ªPD;t = fªrD;kg1k=t = 1 when all prices are °exible and mark-up distortions
disappear. The marginal rate of substitution between labor and durable service °ow
is a function of the current distortion in the production sector, and current and future
distortions in the service sector. Price stickiness in the service market heavily distorts the
current price-rent ratio, and the price stickiness of the good market ampli¯es this e®ect.
Which type of price stickiness quantitatively distorts the economy more? To answer
this question, Fig. 1 shows the gap of the marginal rate of substitution between labor
and service °ows from the °exible-price economy.7 To analyze the stickiness e®ect, we
change the degree of stickiness. The black lines, dashed dark-gray lines, and dash-dotted
light-grey lines indicate ¯rm prices change per year, half year, and quarter, respectively.
The left panel illustrates the case when the purchase price is sticky. When only prices
in the good market are sticky, the price-rent ratio does not deviate too much from the
°exible case. When prices in the service market are sticky, the price-rent ratio distorts
heavily. This is mainly because the service ¯rms are price-takers for the purchase price
and monopolistic competitors for the user cost. When prices in the service market are
°exible, the user cost can be adjusted e±ciently even though the purchase price is sticky.
However, when the user cost is sticky, its responding path to the exogenous shocks is
highly distorted; hence, the price-rent ratio and consumption path also deviate consider-
ably from the case of the °exible-price economy. In response to productivity shocks, the
marginal rate of substitution gap consistently deviates around 0.01 percent; moreover,
twelve quarters later, it still does not return to the steady state. This deviation is directly
related to the welfare cost.
6 Optimal monetary policy
In this section, we derive a welfare-loss function when both service and purchase prices
are sticky. Erceg and Levin (2006) and Petrella and Santoro (2010) derive the welfare-
loss function in the durable-good economy. However, in contrast to their approach, we
7For calibration, see Appendix B.
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analyze the welfare implication of the service °ow and user cost and compare the relative
importance of the service sector in the decision of monetary policy.
We can write a second-order approximation to the household's welfare losses resulting
from the deviations from the e±cient allocation as follows:8
$ ´ ¡E0
1X
t=0
¯tf[U(SD;t)¡ V (Nt)]¡ [U(SeD;t ¡ V (N et )]g
=
USDSD
2
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
½
(¾ ¡ 1)~s2D;t +
(1 + Á)±
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~y
2
t + µrD ~¼
2
rD;t
+
±µPD
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~¼
2
PD;t
¾
;
(28)
where SeD;t and N
e
t are the e±cient levels of durable service and labor in the frictionless
economy. The variables with a tilde denote the log deviations from their e±cient levels.
The coe±cients in the brace on the right-hand side can be interpreted as the optimal
weights that the central bank should minimize. This social loss function reveals that the
central bank should balance not only the °uctuations in output °ow gaps and good-price
in°ation, but also the variability of service °ow gaps and service-price in°ation. The co-
e±cient of each loss term can be interpreted as the relative weight that the central bank
should stabilize. What is the relationship between welfare loss and the physical deprecia-
tion rate? The social loss function equation (28) has at least two important implications.
The coe±cients of the output gap and producer in°ation in the brace are the functions
of the physical depreciation rate. Basically, higher durability quantitatively lowers the
weights of the variables in the production sector. In other words, the central bank should
stabilize the °uctuations of the service °ow gap and service in°ation variability in the
highly durable economy.
8For further derivation, refer to Appendix E.
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7 Optimal simple rule
In this section, we identify parameterizations of monetary rules following the Taylor
rule. We ¯nd the optimized rule by selecting policy-rule coe±cients within the set of
implementable rules so as to minimize the level of welfare loss associated with the resulting
competitive equilibrium.9 In the interest-rate rule, the nominal interest rate depends
linearly on the rates of user cost and purchase price in°ations:
Rt
R
=
µ
¼rD;t
¼rD
¶½¼rDµ¼PD;t
¼PD
¶½¼PD
: (29)
The target values R, ¼rD , and ¼PD are assumed to be the steady-state values of their
associated endogenous variables, which are the same as those in the e±cient allocation
case. Table 1 presents the results. The optimized interest-rate rule turns out to respond
actively to the user cost in°ation and put less weight on the purchase price in°ation.
Fig. 2 displays the welfare cost with di®erent coe±cient parameters in the Taylor rule.
We can observe that a more active response to the user cost in°ation lowers the welfare
cost more. The right panel shows the one in°ation targeting case. In all cases, a high
coe±cient decreases the welfare cost. More importantly, user cost in°ation targeting
lowers the welfare cost more than purchase price targeting does.
8 Comparison with a nondurable good economy
How is the size of welfare losses a®ected by a change in durability? To answer this
question, we characterize the relationship between durability and the loss function. For
brevity, we consider the °exible-price economy case.
We analyze the durability e®ect on the variations of real variables, which are the sizes
of service °ow and output °ow gaps with changing durability. However, service °ow and
output °ow are di®erent in the durable-good economy. Therefore, to compare the service
°ow term with the nondurable-good economy, we rewrite the service °ow gap in terms of
9For our computations, we adopt the perturbation method, following Schmit-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
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the output °ow gaps as follows:10
USDSD
2
E0
1X
t=0
¯t (¾ ¡ 1)s^2D;t
=
USDSD
2
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
½
(¾ ¡ 1)±2
[1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2] y^
2
t +
2(¾ ¡ 1)±2
[1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2]
·
y^t
µ 1X
k=t+1
[¯(1¡ ±)]ky^k
¶¸¾
;
(30)
where s^D;t and y^t denote the log-deviation of service °ow consumption and output °ow
respectively from the steady state level.11 Note that the second term in the brace disap-
pears when ± = 1.
The ¯rst term in the brace can be ignored when ± approaches zero. In a highly
durable-good economy, the steady-state level of consumption service from the durable
stock is huge. As the durable stock-°ow ratio increases, the relative impact of the cur-
rent output °ow gap decreases. Therefore, the welfare loss in the ¯rst term becomes
negligible. The second term is a new term in the durable-good economy. With a high
degree of durability, the newly produced current output °ow in°uences the durable stock
persistently. Therefore, the multiplied term in the bracket strictly increases as durability
increases. Compared to the nondurable good economy, the output °uctuations are huge.
However, the coe±cient converges to zero and the e®ect on the household's welfare is
limited.
9 Does durability increase welfare?
In the former section, the investigation of the loss function in only the form of the output
°ow gaps reveals that durability in°uences the persistence of output gap °uctuations but
does not necessarily increase welfare loss. In this section, we attempt to determine the
relationship between durability and household welfare.
10For further derivation, see Appendix F.
11We also use the production function: y^t = at + n^t.
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9.1 First moment e®ect
We begin with second-order approximations of the period utility, U(SD;t) and V (Nt),
around the steady state:
U(SD;t) ' U(SD)¡ USDSD
µ
¡ s^D;t + (¾ ¡ 1)
2
s^2D;t
¶
; (31)
¡V (Nt) ' ¡V (N)¡ VNN
·
y^t ¡ at + 1 + Á
2
(y^t ¡ at)2
¸
: (32)
These two equations hold even when all prices are °exible. Two e®ects of durability
on welfare are revealed. The ¯rst is the absolute level e®ect with increasing stocks. The
second involves the coe±cient parameters of loss terms in the utility-based loss function,
which we discuss in Proposition 2. The following proposition formally establishes the
result of the ¯rst e®ect.
Proposition 1. Durability strictly increases the steady-state consumption level of the
household.
Proof. On the right-hand side of equation (31), U(SD) is a steady-state utility level from
service °ows, which is a monotonically increasing function of SD, which is also monoton-
ically increasing with durability, (1 ¡ ±). On the other hand, the labor disutility term,
V (N), in equation (32) is a decreasing function of durability in the steady state because
it should be adjusted to equate the intra-temporal equation under the stationary labor
supply in the steady state. ¤
With the same input, the household can enjoy more consumption because higher dura-
bility implies more durable stocks. Therefore, durability strictly increases the ¯rst mo-
ment of the household utility. Fig. 5 depicts this ¯rst-moment e®ect of lifetime wel-
fare, [U(SD)¡V (N)]
1¡¯ . We ¯nd that the ¯rst term is increasing particularly in the region
± 2 f0; 0:1g.
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9.2 Second moment e®ect
The coe±cient terms of the brackets of equations (31) and (32) capture the size of welfare
loss originating from the °uctuations.
Proposition 2. Durability strictly decreases the coe±cients of the deviation terms,
USDSD and VNN , in the household's welfare function.
Proof. USDSD, the coe±cient term of consumption utility, is strictly increasing with ±
unless the relative risk aversion parameter equals one. Plugging SD =
Y
±
and USD = S
¡¾
D ,
we get (Y=±)1¡¾, which is strictly decreasing as durability increases. When the durability
is high, the total stocks to be consumed are abundant. Therefore, the marginal utility of
consumption is lowered.
In the presence of production subsidies, from the equation of the steady state marginal
rate of substitution between labor supply and consumption of durable services, we get
¡VN = 1
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯]USD : (33)
The fraction term on the right-hand side scales the relative size of the period disutility of
labor compared to the period utility of consumption; it is a function of the depreciation
rate. Newly made output is consumed until it totally depreciates, and hence, the marginal
disutility of labor equals the sum of marginal utility of consuming its services. We call
this e®ect the \marginal gain e®ect." Second, from the measure of one-period marginal
disutility of labor, it is clear that the marginal utility of consumption from service °ows,
USD , decreases as durability increases. Overall, the second e®ect dominates the ¯rst one,
so the coe±cient terms strictly decrease as durability increases.12 N is independent of
durability.13 ¤
12Even when there exists no subsidy, Proposition 2 holds.
13To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical evidence to explain the relationship between labor
hours and the durability of goods.
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The two panels in the ¯rst row of Fig. 4 numerically exhibit both the marginal gain e®ects
and VNN , which is a coe±cient term of output deviations in equation (32), which has
di®erent risk-aversion parameters. The marginal gains increase as durability increases.
For example, when ± = 0:1, the marginal gains are almost nine times as large as they are
in the nondurable case. Note that if ± = 1, when there is no durability of goods, there is
no marginal gain. On the other hand, the disutility of labor and the coe±cient term of
output deviations decrease as durability increases. This is because the strong concavity of
the utility function of service °ows implies that the marginal utility of consumption does
not increase even though consumption does. Therefore, the scale parameter, º should
be adjusted to equate the marginal disutility of labor and the marginal gains. Panel D
displays the relative size of coe±cient terms, VNN
USDSD
. In all cases, we observe that the
coe±cient terms of disutility of working decrease more as durability increases.
Proposition 2 reveals that the period welfare is inclined to increase as durability
increases. The smaller the coe±cient terms in Proposition 2, the higher the period
welfare. This is because they are the scale parameters of the second-order loss terms.
10 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied the role of durable goods and the service market in the
New Keynesian model. In the presence of price stickiness, in°ation variability is costly.
Hence, a monetary policy will have to optimally balance the incentive to o®set the price
stickiness distortion. In this paper, we split the durable market into the service and
production sectors, and derive the traditional user cost equation, the price-rent ratio,
and the social loss function.
The fundamental contribution of this paper is as follows. First, the price-rent ratio
critically depends on nominal rigidity in the service market. This is because when the
user cost is sticky and the purchase price is °exible (as is the case in a housing market),
the price-rent ratio is in°uenced by the future distortions of the user cost. Second, we ¯nd
that the central bank should stabilize the service sector when goods are highly durable,
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even in the case where the degrees of nominal rigidity in both service and goods markets
are the same. Third, we ¯nd that in comparison with the nondurable economy, social
welfare loss is not increasing, although a temporary shock persistently a®ects the output
°uctuations. Fourth, high durability increases welfare.
However, there are several remaining issues that would be worthwhile areas for future
research. First, we may need to study a large shock, a situation that was not discussed in
the paper. Productivity shocks in the production sector may be not enough to explain a
large recession such as the recent housing boom and bust in the U.S. economy. There may
well be other factors that a®ect this, such as irrational exuberance. Second, we do not
examine the situation where goods with di®erent durability coexist. There exist many
di®erent characteristics, introducing many goods. Third, we need to introduce other
features into the model so that we can identify more implications of the monetary policy
for durable goods. Lumpiness of durables or news shocks are both good examples that
would warrant investigation. Fourth, it may also be bene¯cial to use another approach,
such as Ramsey problem approach, to identify the optimal monetary policy.
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Appendix A: Deterministic steady state
We consider a frictionless steady-state in which all the shocks are zero and in which
monetary policymakers set their respective CPI in°ation rates to zero:
¼rD = 1;¼PD = 1:
From the Euler equation, the nominal interest rate and the price of claims become:
R =
1
¯
:
The real marginal costs are
¥rD =
¹¡1rD¿rD
1¡ (1¡ ±)¯ ; ¥PD = ¹
¡1
PD
¿PD ;
where ¿rD = ¹rD and ¿PD = ¹PD . We assume that the steady state is not distorted by
the monopolistic competition. Compared to production sectors, the real marginal cost in
the durable service sector is higher.
The real wage becomes:
w = ¥PD :
We set the steady state labor level as one third. (N = 1=3) Then combining produc-
tion functions, the good market conditions, and the law of motion of durable goods, we
get
N = Y = ID = ±D
) D = 1
3±
:
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From the rental market clearing condition
SD = D:
Appendix B: Calibration and numerical simulation results
Time is in quarters and we set the quarterly discount factor as ¯ = 0:99. This implies that
the annual real interest rate is pinned down by the household's patience rate and is equal
to 4 %. The annual depreciation rate in the benchmark case is 5 % (± = 0:05=4) following
previous studies on long-lived durables. Following Monacelli (2009), the elasticity of
substitution between varieties in the non-durable and the durable sectors "PD and "PC
are set equal to 6, which yields a steady state mark-up of 20 %. In the benchmark case,
we set the degree of nominal rigidity in service and good prices to generate a frequency of
price adjustment of about four quarters. Let · be the probability of not resetting prices in
the standard Calvo-Yun model. Log linearized Phillips curve in this model is "
µ
, while it is
(1¡·)(1¡¯·)
·
in the Calvo-Yun model. A price rigidity of four quarters is a standard in the
recent literature so we take it as a benchmark parameter (· = 0:75). The period utility
function is assumed to be:
S¾¡1D;t
¾¡1 ¡ ºN
1+Á
t
1+Á
. Following the existing literature on durable
goods, we set ¾ = 1 and Á = 1. In the analysis of optimal monetary policy, we change the
value of ¾ and search for the implication of welfare. The elasticity parameter, Á, is set
to one in all cases. Therefore, the scale parameter, º, is adjusted for the intra-temporal
condition to hold in equality with the change of durability.
Appendix C: First-best economy
The social planner solves the following problem:
maxE0
1X
t=0
¯tU(SD;t; Nt)
s:t: Dt ¡ (1¡ ±)Dt¡1 = ID;t = AtND;t;
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where the constraint equation is the consolidated resource constraint.
The optimality conditions are given by
USD;t = ¡¸t + (1¡ ±)¯Etf¸t+1g:
UNt = At¸t:
Combining this result we get
At = ¡ UNt
USD;t
+ (1¡ ±)¯Et
½
USD;t+1
USD;t
At
At+1
UNt+1
USD;t+1
¾
:
The left-hand side is the marginal product of labor. The right-hand side is the net
marginal rate of substitution between hours of work and consumption.
In the steady state,
¡ UN
USD
=
1
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] :
Appendix D: Sticky price economy
The Euler equation as a log-deviation form from the e±cient allocation economy becomes
~sD;t = Et~sD;t+1 ¡ 1
¾
(it ¡ Et¼rD;t+1 ¡ ret );
where ~sD;t ´ sD;t ¡ seD;t is the output gap.
Production function and marginal costs in the sticky price economy becomes
yt = at + nt
»rD;t = pD;t ¡ rD;t
»PD;t = Á¶t + ¾sD;t ¡ »rD;t ¡ (1 + Á)at:
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Marginal cost gaps from the steady state are:
»^PD;t = Á¶^t + ¾s^D;t ¡ »^rD;t ¡ (1 + Á)a^t:
The new Keynesian Phillips curve is
¼^rD;t = ¯Et¼^rD;t+1 +
"rD ¡ 1
µrD [1¡ (1¡ ±)¯]
·
»^rD;t ¡ (1¡ ±)¯Et(U^SD;t+1 ¡ U^SD;t + »^rD;t+1)
¸
¼^PD;t = ¯Et¼^PD;t+1 +
"PD ¡ 1
µPD
»^PD;t;
where »^rD;t is the price-rent ratio gap. The durability a®ects the slope of the Phillips curve
and net real marginal cost gap in the service sector. The Phillips curve in the service
sector exhibits a higher slope as durability increases. Furthermore, net real marginal cost
decreases because two terms in the brace cancel out each other with high durability.
Plugging the Euler equation into the NKPC in the service sector,
Ã^rD;t =
·
P^D;t ¡ r^D;t ¡ (1¡ ±)¯Et(U^SD;t+1 ¡ U^SD;t + P^D;t+1 ¡ r^D;t+1)
¸
(34)
where Ã^rD;t ´ µrD [1¡(1¡±)¯]"rD¡1 (¼^rD;t ¡ ¯Et¼^rD;t+1).
We can also express the new Keynesian Phillips curve as the real marginal cost equa-
tion in terms of the price stickiness:
»^rD;t =
1X
k=t
[(1¡ ±)¯]k¡tEt
½
µrD [1¡ (1¡ ±)¯]
"rD ¡ 1
(¼^rD;k ¡ ¯¼^rD;k+1) + (1¡ ±)¯(U^SD;k+1 ¡ U^SD;k)
¾
=
1X
k=t
[(1¡ ±)¯]k¡tEt[Ã^rD;k + (1¡ ±)¯(U^SD;k+1 ¡ U^SD;k)] ´ ^^ÃrD;t (35)
»^PD;t =
µPD
"PD ¡ 1
(¼^PD;t ¡ ¯Et¼^PD;t+1) = Ã^PD;t (36)
Notice that the gap of price-dividend ratio is larger than that of real marginal cost in the
production sector even in the case of the same rigidity (µrD = µPD).
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Appendix E: Derivation of second-order approximation of welfare
around the undistorted °exible price equilibrium allocation
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), we derive a well-de¯ned welfare function
from the utility function of the representative household around the e±cient equilibrium
allocation:
Wt ´ U(SD;t)¡ V (Nt):
Under our assumptions the e±cient equilibrium allocation corresponds to the °exible
price equilibrium allocation with no mark-up distortion. For brevity, we de¯ne Ut ´
U(SD;t), Vt ´ V (Nt), U et ´ U(SeD;t), and V et ´ V (N et ). The second order approximation
of the utility from consumption of durable services are:
Ut ¡ U et ' U eSD;tSeD;t
µ
SD;t ¡ SeD;t
SeD;t
¶
+
1
2
U eSDSD;t(S
e
D;t)
2
µ
SD;t ¡ SeD;t
SeD;t
¶2
' U eSD;tSeD;t
µ
~sD;t +
1¡ ¾
2
~s2D;t
¶
The disutility of labor in period t becomes:
Vt ¡ V et ' V eNtN et
µ
Nt ¡N et
N et
¶
+
1
2
V eNN;t(N
e
t )
2
µ
Nt ¡N et
N et
¶2
= V eN;tN
e
t
µ
~nt +
1 + Á
2
~n2t
¶
+ o(jjajj2)
' V eN;tN et
µ
~yt +
1 + Á
2
(~yt)
2
¶
;
using the production function relationship, ~nt = ~yt, in the last equation.
Consider the linear terms in Wt:
~LW t ' U eSD;tSeD;t~sD;t + V eN;tN et ~yt
Recalling that when the optimal subsidy is in place, the °exible price allocation is
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e±cient, we get
V eN;t
U eSD;t
=
1
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] :
Therefore the linear term becomes
~LW t = U
e
SD;t
SeD;t
½
~sD;t ¡ ±
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~yt
¾
:
By the way, from the market clearing conditions until the second-order approximation,
we get:
~sD;t ' ~dt ¡ µrD
2
¼^2rD;t; ~¶t ' ~yt ¡
µPD
2
¼^2PD;t:
Plugging these results into the linear term, we get
~LW t = U
e
SD;t
SeD;t
½
~dt ¡ µrD
2
~¼2rD;t ¡
±
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯]
µ
~¶t +
µPD
2
~¼2PD;t
¶¾
:
We can drop the linear terms in LWt after substituting the stock gap into the °ow gap,
14
because:
1X
t=0
¯tU eSD;tS
e
D;t
~dt =
1X
t=0
¯tU eSD;tS
e
D;t
½
±~¶t
[1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)]
¾
:
We are left only with second-order real terms as well as in°ation volatility:
E0
1X
t=0
¯t[(Ut ¡ Vt)¡ (U et ¡ V et )]
' ¡E0
1X
t=0
¯t
U eSD;tS
e
D;t
2
½
(¾ ¡ 1)~s2D;t +
(1 + Á)±
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~y
2
t + µrD ~¼
2
rD;t
+
±µPD
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~¼
2
PD;t
¾
:
It is clear that the gaps of durable stocks and service in°ation become important as
durability increases. Notice that the coe±cients of these terms become larger as the
14For further derivation, refer to the appendix G.
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depreciation rate approaches to zero.
Furthermore, we derive a ¯rst order approximation to USeD;tS
e
D;t around the steady
state:
U eSD;tS
e
D;t = USDSD + (USDSDSD + USD)
µ
SeD;t ¡ SD
SD
¶
= USDSD + USDSD(1¡ ¾)s^eD;t:
Accordingly, we can write a second order approximation to the household's welfare
losses resulting from deviations from the e±cient allocation as:
$ ´ ¡E0
1X
t=0
¯t[(Ut ¡ Vt)¡ (U et ¡ V et )]
=
USDSD
2
E0
1X
t=0
¯t
½
(¾ ¡ 1)~s2D;t +
(1 + Á)±
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~y
2
t + µrD ~¼
2
rD;t
+
±µPD
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ~¼
2
PD;t
¾
:
(37)
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Appendix F: Welfare loss in terms of output °ow
We express the ¯rst term in the social loss function in terms of output °ow. The ¯rst
term in the brace on the right hand side of equation (37) becomes:
E0
1X
t=0
¯ts^2D;t 'E0
1X
t=0
¯td^2t
= ±2E0
½
¶^2D;0
+ ¯
·µ
(1¡ ±)2¶^2D;0 + ¶^2D;1
¶
+ 2(1¡ ±)¶^D;1¶^D;0
¸
+ ¯2
·µ
(1¡ ±)4¶^2D;0 + (1¡ ±)2¶^2D;1 + ¶^2D;2
¶
+ 2
µ
(1¡ ±)¶^D;2¶^D;1 + (1¡ ±)2¶^D;2¶^D;0 + (1¡ ±)3¶^D;1¶^D;0
¶¸
+ ¯3
·µ
(1¡ ±)6¶^2D;0 + (1¡ ±)4¶^2D;1 + (1¡ ±)2¶^2D;2 + ¶^2D;3
¶
+ 2
µ
(1¡ ±)¶^D;3¶^D;2 + (1¡ ±)2¶^D;3¶^D;1 + (1¡ ±)3¶^D;3¶^D;0
+ (1¡ ±)3¶^D;2¶^D;1 + (1¡ ±)4¶^D;2¶^D;0 + (1¡ ±)5¶^D;1¶^D;0
¶¸
+ ¢ ¢ ¢
¾
:
Therefore, we can divide it into the square-term part and the cross-term part. The
square-term part becomes
±2E0
·
¶^2D;0
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2 +
¯¶^2D;1
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2 +
¯2¶^2D;2
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2 + ¢ ¢ ¢
¸
=
±2
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2E0
1X
t=0
¯t¶^2D;t:
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On the other hands, the cross-term part becomes
2±2
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2E0
½
¯(1¡ ±)¶^D;0d^D;1 + [¯(1¡ ±)]2¶^D;0¶^D;2 + [¯(1¡ ±)]3¶^D;0¶^D;3 + ¢ ¢ ¢
+ ¯
·
¯(1¡ ±)¶^D;1¶^D;2 + [¯(1¡ ±)]2¶^D;1¶^D;3 + [¯(1¡ ±)]3¶^D;1¶^D;4 + ¢ ¢ ¢
...
+ ¯t¡1
·
¯(1¡ ±)¶^D;t¡1¶^D;t + [¯(1¡ ±)]2¶^D;t¡1¶^D;t+1 + [¯(1¡ ±)]3¶^D;t¡1¶^D;t+2 + ¢ ¢ ¢
...
¾
:
In the compact form, it becomes:
2±2
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2E0
1X
t=0
¯t¶^D;t
½ 1X
s=t+1
[¯(1¡ ±)]s¶^D;s
¾
:
Therefore, ignoring third and fourth ordered terms we get
E0
1X
t=0
¯ts^2D;t '
±2
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2E0
1X
t=0
¯t
½
y^2t + 2y^t
· 1X
s=t+1
[¯(1¡ ±)]sy^s
¸¾
; (38)
which is the sum of the squared terms and cross-product terms.
Therefore the life-time welfare loss is
1X
t=0
(Wt ¡W ) ' ¡USY
2
1X
t=0
¯t
½
(¾ ¡ 1)±
[1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)2]
·
y^2t + 2y^t
µ 1X
s=t+1
[¯(1¡ ±)]sy^s
¶¸
+
(1 + Á)
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] (y^t ¡ at)
2
+
µrD
±
¼^2rD;t +
µPD
[1¡ (1¡ ±)¯] ¼^
2
PD;t
¾
: (39)
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Appendix G: Relationship between life-time gaps of durable stock
and °ow
The derivations are explained by Petrella and Emiliano (2010). Thus, we only show a
brief explaination. When the future gap is discounted,
E0
1X
t=0
¯td^t = ±E0
½
¶^D;0
+ ¯
·
(1¡ ±)¶^D;0 + ¶^D;1
¸
+ ¯2
·
(1¡ ±)2¶^D;0 + (1¡ ±)¶^D;1 + ¶^D;2
¸
+ ¢ ¢ ¢
¾
=±E0
½·
1 + ¯(1¡ ±) + [¯(1¡ ±)]2 + [¯(1¡ ±)]3 + ¢ ¢ ¢
¸
¶^D;0
+ ¯
·
1 + ¯(1¡ ±) + [¯(1¡ ±)]2 + [¯(1¡ ±)]3 + ¢ ¢ ¢
¸
¶^D;1
+ ¯2
·
1 + ¯(1¡ ±) + [¯(1¡ ±)]2 + [¯(1¡ ±)]3 + ¢ ¢ ¢
¸
¶^D;2 + ¢ ¢ ¢
¾
=E0
1X
t=0
¯t
±¶^D;t
[1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)] : (40)
Minimizing the current output gap means minimizing its in°uence on the durable
future stock gap.
This relationship also holds around the undistorted °exible price equilibrium alloca-
tion. In this case, s^D;t = d^t and ¶^D;t = y^t so Proposition 3 holds.
Because ~dt = (1¡ ±) ~dt¡1 + ±~¶D;t holds, the following equality also holds:
E0
1X
t=0
¯t ~dt = E0
1X
t=0
¯t
±~¶D;t
[1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)] : (41)
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Table 1: Optimal monetary policy
½¼rD ½¼D Welfare cost
Optimized Rule 4 1.9 -0.0086
User cost target rule 1.5 | -0.0082
Purchase price targe rule | 1.5 -0.0059
Note: (second-order) welfare cost computation of the policy rule
Rt
R
=
µ
¼rD;t
¼rD
¶½¼rDµ¼PD;t
¼PD
¶½¼PD
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Fig. 1: Marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption
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Note: The left panel is the case when the purchase price is sticky, while the right panel is the case when
the user cost is sticky.
Fig. 2: Welfare Cost
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Fig. 3: First-moment welfare gain e®ect from durability
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Fig. 4: Marginal gains and loss function coe±cient term
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